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Excerpts from:
Animal Songs: Translation, Community, The Question of the 'Animal': Information
(Introduction, Chapter 3, Conclusion)

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> As for me, I talk about the philosopher, but I am not simply a philosopher....It is in this strategic context that on occasion I have spoken of philosophy's usefulness in translating or deciphering a number of things, such as what goes on in the media, and so on.
>
> Jacques Derrida, "Roundtable on Translation"

Preface

What follows are passages taken from a longer work entitled, Animal Songs: Translation, Community, The Question of the "Animal" :: Information, which was written in the Fall of 1993. I have excerpted the introduction, most of the third (last) chapter, and the conclusion to that work for this publication. The first and second chapters were on translation ("'Me' a name, I call myself..." :: Translation) and information and community ("On a clear day, you can see forever" :: Postmodern/Postapocalypse), respectively. I have revised and edited the work to coincide with an increase in my understanding of some of its sources, as well as to increase its use by a Library and Information Studies readership.

Nevertheless, as the introductory quote from Derrida indicates, the language of theory is taken seriously as providing conceptual tools for understanding the problem of information in our day. Thus, the language of this paper may prove difficult for some readers. I should, therefore, explain that it has not been my intention to be totally "clear" in communicating an "understanding" to the reader, partially because it is this very conduit or correspondence model of language and meaning which is challenged in this paper, as well as the ideological assumptions implicit within a rhetoric of "clarity" and "understanding." It is the function of theory to intervene at certain points where it is readily assumed that the future will, or indeed must, occur. This intervention in the future is precisely what makes theory critical, and positions it as something other than historicism. Consequently, it is my hope that the language of this paper provokes a critical thinking of some

issues regarding information and communication and provokes a use of some of its conceptual and bibliographical tools for a critical praxis. It is my hope that this paper is somewhat precise and rigorous as to its sources and its points of intervention, rather than it repeats what "everyone" already more or less knows and therefore gives the comfort of being "clear."

Introduction

What follows constitutes a reading of community according to progressively deterritorialized readings of the term "information." This term engages various models which may be described as: information as commodity, exchange, presence and re-presentation, message, sending and reception; information as flow; information as the meeting of forces, the site of affect, and the becoming into being of forms (indicated in this text by the term, "in-formation"). These three positions correspond to three relations toward reading alterity: that of information-as-thing (as Buckland phrases it); information as circulation and discourse, merging, grafting, and hybridization; that of the event of time, and the creation and formation of beings from a shared informational line of becoming. How we think of community, I would argue, is a question of how we read alterity.

Previously, originating from the Western metaphysical cultural tradition of identity (or as Derrida more precisely writes, "presence") and, consequently, a tradition of communication theory, information was defined according to conduit models for language and correspondence models for truth. This is to say that information was understood to be a "thing" which was present and relatively unchanging, and that it was transmitted from one understanding to another through language, speech, or some other "medium" (Weaver's rereading of Shannon's notion of information may be read in this light). This understanding of "information," however, is no longer

adequate, because we live in an age where the classical subject (and its "understanding"), "objects" and sending and receiving are inadequate descriptions of communication, social structure and physis in general. We are beings who are always inhabited by a world of matter and sense, and our understanding of beings cannot distance itself from these initial conditions. As David Hume argued over 200 years ago, even our sense of rationality and cognition derive from these relations: a "common sense" far beyond that "common sense" of humanism. Nor can the problem of information be restricted to what has previously been thought through "communicational" theories of regulated exchange and community (I have in mind here the work of Habermas, among others). If "information" can no longer simply denote "datum" and its transfer, it also can no longer uncritically refer to the appearance of "meaning" through ghostly or rhetorical stabilizing contexts of "reason" or a common social "understanding."

Rather, the problem that lies before us is not how to make use of information, but how we are shaped by information--both as "social" and as "natural" forces. This is an aesthetic question in the sense that we are asking about forces, affects, becoming, formation and form. As Nietzsche indicated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, all knowledge has its roots in sense and begins in the company of "animals"....

"If we could talk to the animals..."

The Limits of "Man"

> Community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without another singular being, and that there is, therefore, what might be called, in a rather inappropriate idiom, an originary or ontological "sociality" that in its principle extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a social being (the zoon politikon is secondary to this community). For, on the one hand, it is not obvious that the community of singularities is limited to "man" and excludes, for example, the "animal" (even in the case of "man" it is not a fortiori certain that this community concerns only "man" and not also the "inhuman" or the "superman," or, for example, if I may say so with and without a certain Witz, "woman": after all, the difference between the sexes is itself a singularity in the difference of singularities). On the other hand, if social being is always posited as a predicate of man, community would signify on the contrary the basis for thinking only something like "man." But this thinking would at the same time remain dependent upon a principal determination of community, namely, that there is no communion of singularities in a totality superior to them and immanent to their common being. (Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 28)

Traditionally in the Western cultural tradition, so-called "animals" constitute the negative background upon which the figure of "man" is constituted. Thus, as Derrida finely argues, even in Heidegger's work, language is understood as the tracing and retracing of this figure of "man," and within this figure, spirit can be authenticated in terms of a further working of language proper to man, namely, as the rational development of history.(1)

The border between man and animal is the most closely guarded border of reason, especially in terms of language. The secret to language's closeness to man, namely its "rationality," however, is breached by Heidegger's destruction of the ontotheological tradition, and with it, the rational origins for the technological "world view." Language regains its deeply human space for Heidegger, however, in its relation to the question of Being. In the question of Being (experienced as an opening, breach or caesura (in the experience of being-toward-death or in Heidegger's later writings in historical breaches)), poetic language traces the relation between human existence (Dasein) and the nothing (das Nicht) before it. As has been noted by others, foremost Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger's co-primordial term for the event of truth in Being and Time, namely, Mitsein (being-with), is not as fully developed as being-toward-death and anxiety in that work. It is my contention that what is at stake in the forgetting of Mitsein is not only (as Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested in "The Inoperative Community") the avoidance of the communal nature of the experience of death (as an experience only understood through another's death), but even more determinately, such an analytic of the human "individual" avoids the very serious ruptures that occur along the border of humans and "animals."

If information is to be rethought from being the presence and representation of data, we must confront the problem of thinking information in relation to a metaphysical anthropomorphism --humanism--and confront the question of the animal. It is only through confronting the "vagaries" of the animal that the transcendent community of "man" can be adequately critiqued, understanding circumscribed, and information displaced from its metaphysical inscriptions.

Certainly, the standard model of information as presence and re-presentation is dubious on many fronts, foremost that it composes itself around a notion of a universal material immanence that is most certainly and properly understood in the mind of man. As Derrida has suggested, such an understanding of matter, as evidence speaking for itself to man, is most firmly grounded in the trope of human "speech" as science--as the true expression of "reality" through a fully articulate "rational" mind.

Thus, the curious twist to Wittgenstein's aphorism, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (Philosophical Investigations, 223e). Wittgenstein is here speaking of the strange, uncanny, or perhaps we can even say, unheimlich experience of

entering a "foreign country" (223e) (a metaphor for the "enigma" of the other--particularly as "animal" (i.e., "lion")) and he is arguing that though we may know the language of the country we still may not know their way of life (and thus, we will not understand the meaning of their words). Understanding here, as earlier in the Investigations, is not a question of finding the "true" meaning of words, but rather, of being able to perform acts that are said to be true by the other. Information is, here, that which occurs outside of the correspondence of meaning between minds vis-a-vis the "understanding" (and thus, no absolute criteria could be achieved for what is useful or not, relevant or not). Like the conditional statement regarding animal speech in Dr. Doolittle ("If we could talk to the animals...") and like so many of the propositions in the Investigations, the possibility of animal speech is seen as something at the edge of language (or, at least, the edge of the humanist metaphysics of language). Despite Wittgenstein's own predilections toward a pragmatics of language, both speech and a certain human understanding (said to be separate from a lion's "understanding") are patrolled by this conditional "if" along the border of human propriety. (Therefore, all the behaviorists absurdities of humans teaching apes "language," etc..) The fact is that we are always already talking to the animals and they to us by virtue of our being-with "them" in this world. That we share a world with other animals gives us the very ability to be "not-them." And it is in this sharing and continual coming into a world that the human world may always conditionally, but in total actuality, emerge. The question is not whether we are "talking" to animals and they are talking to us, but rather, what is the nature of that in-forming which is inherent in becoming relations of Mitsein and results in the forms of animals (both as species and individuals) and physis in general.

Because, for Wittgenstein, speech is bound to species categories, communication becomes trivialized along the borders of human "understanding." Wittgenstein's rejection of psychologism prevents him from thematizing these conditions of the understanding in a non-pragmatic way ("They [psychological conditions] are not readily accessible" he states immediately above the lion statement). But through this same pragmatic reasoning, the language or understanding of the lion, too, cannot readily be separated from that of the human. Contrary to Wittgenstein's notion of entering "into a strange country with entirely strange traditions," it is the very strangeness of every speech act that elicits a pragmatic emergence of meaning. As Nancy remarks in his analysis of the Platonic hermeneia ("Sharing Voices"), and I believe it is a central point in Derrida's critique of Searle and Austin's theory of speech acts, it is the uncanniness or indeterminateness of every speech act which requires the criteria of pragmatic meaning. In other words, language is meaningful only by being always already shared, in the sense that it is meaningful only in this prior sharing. As Nancy suggests, such sharing is prior to interpretation, and it is grounded in the common becomings of singular beings and in their gestures of reply.

When it comes to talking with "animals" (other than "ourselves"--and what these terms mean, without duplicating the general form of fascism, is quite dubious), we

must take Nancy's argument further, and further deconstruct the privilege of "rational" language as the grounds for community. Such a deconstruction of the privileging of "rational" enunciation would begin a deconstruction of the purely human community as the community where speech and understanding properly belong (the community of logos). The danger in humanism lies not only in essentializing the human community, but also in isolating humans from a physical, material community. It is by means of such isolation that human specificity becomes the anthropomorphism of humanism.

When we talk with one another, "agreement" is an a posteriori bracketing off of the multiplicity of our relations and of our replies. It is not true that we must have "rational understanding" in order to have meaning. Conduit or correspondence models of meaning production, which operate within mechanical systems of "retrieval," for example, are overly simple models of reply because the range of use and counterreply is limited to the fulfillment of a preordained task which is tightly regulated by collections of texts, subject terms, controlled access methods, etc.. If this were an accurate model for communication in the world at large, then there would be no event of history and no change in language--for the forms of the world would never change. Our interactions with "animals," however, are not so different than with each other. That is to say, our interactions with animals preserve what is essential to our relations with one another: namely, the finite infinity of our replies and the necessity of such replies for any meaning.

In-formational lines and relays of reply, as "language" or other affects, come before the classical subject of will and representation can even be imagined. Meaning is not a destination inherent within language by means of either rhetoric, understanding, "ordinary language" or hidden language games (i.e., "contexts"), but is the pragmatic affects which constitute being (and this statement applies to self-address as well). Language speaks as relays of reply which run before any speaker, "context," or meaning. Language lies before them, and because of this, the community of "us" always already lies before any "one." After Derrida's critique of Lacan, we may say that there is no reason the letter must reach its destination, because there is no destination for a letter to reach outside of its play. Simply, there is no more reason to limit such lines of information or actions of reply to any one "species" of animal (i.e., "man"), than there is to limit such replies to "men," "rational persons," "normal persons," "well-educated persons," "citizens," "non-prisoners," etc.. In fact, such terms designate idealized locations of repression that constitute nothing and no one, because they assume that what "all know" (all the ones who "count") is true and absolutely well-known. Thus, the idealized location of Hegel's Absolute Being is in this sense the mass knowledge of Heidegger's Alltäglichkeit (everyday knowledge). The Idealist state of "the people" is, thus, both absolutely idealized and absolutely vulgar, that is, it is the embodiment, as was the case with both the science and the popular culture of National Socialism (though such a case is not alone in speaking in such a way of "the people") of the fascist state. Humanism, in its attribution of reply from and only to the human, is the fascism of the human. The random consumption, destruction, and the absolute negation of even the liberal category of "rights" in

regard to the "animal" can say no more. Within the philosophical tradition, humanism absolutely forbids the notion of inter-species language, community, or even more radically in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, "becoming-animal." There is, simply, no more important and transcendentally protected category than the human, and no more consumed and expelled category than the "animal" in Western culture. The question of the animal is, before all other questions, the question of "man." It is no accident that the position of the not-man and, therefore, the "animal"--the woman (as "plant" in Hegel), the ("black") "races" (in Hume and Kant, as apes or missing links)--are continually bound together. The category of "the animal" symbolizes the absolute territorialization and classification of "humans" through what is sensed by power as its own "proper" society. It is the first and the last category which excludes the community of physis, and which, by so doing, comes to determinately define a community in terms of humanism and the state. "The human" is the category of categories for humanism and for science understood as law.

In many ways, the question of community posed by Nancy is duplicated in the problem of the animal, except on a much larger, much more fundamental scale. The question is not whether animals can talk with "us" or "us" with "them" (the ridiculousness of such semantics is evident if "we" remember that "we" are animals...), but by what violence of cultural metaphysics does this binary relation arise? How is it that the human species becomes so distinct that that which joins community (the line of language, of affect; the corresponding gesture of reply), that which is between individuals and "species" (simultaneously both marking their joining and their singularity) becomes the property of man? Or, to put this question another way, how does the line of information and the gesture of reply become equivalent to humanity itself? Is not the very question of human being a question of the human's a priori joining with other animals--a joining that is not simply marked with every gesture in terms of humanity's being, but a difference which, by virtue of being beyond the human exceeds human "understanding" and exceeds the techne of design and inscription which gives the human only one of its specificities? No matter how much "man" may mark this distinction, such inscription cannot give the sum total of human's being within the community of the animal and of physis. If this were so, if human animals were simply "man" (as the Western tradition, including Heidegger, argue when arguing against "the animal" in terms of logos), then all affective relations would have to be abandoned as secondary to man. In the face of the question of the animal, the retreat of Heideggerian thought back to the specificity of human existence in terms of ontology attempts to "save" the abandonment of humans to their animalness. The animal must be thought in terms other than consumption, sacrifice, and a categorical exclusion. And this means, since humans are first of all animals, that exteriorized humans too must be thought through notions of community other than those which define themselves through the consumption, sacrifice, and categorical exclusion of the "other" (nationalisms, self-identities, so-called racial and ethnic identities--all assumed outside of their historical and political contexts and reified essentially as that which "I am" or "we are").

"Becoming-Animal..."

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (the second book of Capitalism and Schizophrenia) propose, particularly in their tenth chapter, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...," a radically immanent manner of thinking the infinite space of finitude between singular animals. In part departing from a reading of Spinoza's Ethics, they postulate "lines" or "planes" according to shared expressions of organisms (planes of "consistency or composition," the most primary being that of extension and thought, which for Spinoza were the two attributes of God by which humans can postulate God's existence as the infinite). Deleuze and Guattari perform a positive reading of finitude, rather than the negative reading which comes out of the German philosophical tradition as epitomized in Hegel's philosophy. It is a thinking of alterity, but from the aspect of the finite singularity of all beings in their joining.

For Deleuze and Guattari, all beings are products of becomings occurring around multiple affections and along lines of consistency. Such lines are informational lines in the sense that they are not so much previously categorized or "territorialized" lines of production, as lines in-forming beings through forceful contact. Information, in this more general sense, is a given condition of being-in-the-world, rather than something produced by will and individual intention. In the Western tradition, mind as the reflection of truth gives itself the power of representing all affections in terms of laws and their hierarchical and binary relations. Consequently, information is understood solely in terms of the idealized systematicity of mind, rather than as asymmetrical and non-congruous affects. The result is the hierarchicalization of nature according to law and outside of the becoming of time. It is upon this vertical plane of law that relations are organized as states, individuals, and other formal bodies of stasis.

Through their discussion of becoming and "the animal," Deleuze and Guattari force us not only to think what they call "the body without organs" (bodies purely composed according to the plane of consistency), but force us to rethink "information" flows outside of systematicity. "Communication," they explain with reference to Bergson, is not the exchange of data among "equal" organisms which are said to possess a common mode of "understanding," but it is the interaction of heterogenous beings of different speeds and intensities who do indeed "coexist" with each other and make sense of each other through the facts of their affects and their mutual becomings (238). As Deleuze and Guattari argue, affect does not occur by the sending of messages between two beings, but instead, by the mutual becomings of forces which result in the enunciation of organisms. Thus, information and communication cannot be limited to the notion of classical exchange, and the total constriction of such terms within the question of man, and most of all, the question of the understanding, proves illegitimate.

(The importance of thinking information other than in terms of presence and the exchange of such, lies not only in thinking the interaction of humans with other animals, but also in thinking the relation of humans and machines. For example, no model of the understanding can adequately explain lines of addiction that join humans and computers. The importance of Deleuze and Guattari's arguments lie in their ability to speak of information in modes other than that of the understanding, and to begin thinking Mitsein in terms of zones of ontological inter-mappings, grafted becomings, singularities, and expression.)

Becomings occur, in Deleuze and Guattari's works, according to proximity rather than through processes of identification. Proximity constitutes zone along a common line of becoming "between" two organisms. "Between two organisms" does not refer to the priority of organisms and the "between" that happens to be between them, but rather, the between lies before the organisms according to planes of continuity and is that which they enter from their past as one of their possible variations.

> "Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away; a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle."(25)

Such deterritorializations of the recent past singularity of an organism are always already potentially there and constitute the joining of an organism from the "outside"--an outside already within the folds of the organism as one of its openings and one of its possible becomings. As Deleuze and Guattari write,

> [D]etteritorialization is always double, because it implies the coexistence of a major variable and a minor variable in simultaneous becoming (the two terms of a becoming do not exchange places, there is no identification between them, they are instead drawn into an asymmetrical block in which both change to the same extent and which constitutes their zone of proximity). (306)

The zone of proximity is characterized by defamiliarization, estrangement, and monstrosity. Within its certain uncertainty, form is returned to its relatively amorphous state in time in the body without organs, but just as quickly it seizes and is grasped by those lines which it opens towards either innately or by habit. Thus, to use Deleuze and Guattari's example, the bird and the painting are married along color and line (304). The cat is Oedipalized, but the "owner" is effaced as "man"-- keeper and guardian of nature--by the refusal of the cat to be fully "my" cat. "I" touch a cat means that "cat" touches me. The virus which attacks "my body" mutates according to that body's organism and defenses, which in turn also cause "my body" to mutate.

Questions of human benefits or "effects" are secondary to zones of in-forming. Information flows are first of all a-systemic and non-teleological in that they cannot contain and limit their mutations. Information itself differs from the classical and modernist epistemology of knowledge and the understanding because information is precisely those affects which escape the control of "man" and thus, are conditions for concepts such as, "knowledge" and "understanding." Procedures may be available for controlling these mutations into a system of inputs and outputs, however, and for setting up zones of organization and development: for example, a vaccine may slow or temporarily make ineffectual a virus within the human body, thus allowing it to circulate without a crippling effect upon the "host." But in general, relations between beings grow outward; they create mutations. Even the "controlled" virus mutates over time, and it does so precisely because of the affects of control over it. Overload is due to an increase in what may be considered "relevant," but this criteria is itself due to prior increased mutations. Even within the sciences, where there are strict methodological and linguistic laws upon what is to be considered "relevant," information "grows" instead of becoming more simple ("simplicity"--this dream of philosophy and science--is clearly counterfactual to their own history).

The line of information which passes "between" organisms itself expresses singularities within their zones of becoming. What passes "between" organisms, that is to say what joins them along a plane of continuity, marks their exteriority along a line of flight, and constitutes their being deterritorialized within a general body without organs. This is a body that is constituted by its exteriority rather than by its interiority. Memory and identity are constituted by means of lines of affect, rather than by a reflective recovery of "self" along an imaginary historical plane:

> From this point of view, one may contrast a childhood block, or a becoming-child, with the childhood memory: "a" molecular child is produced..."a" child coexists with us, in a zone of proximity or a block of becoming, on a line of deterritorialization that carries us both off-- as opposed to the child we once were, whom we remember or fantasize, the molar child whose future is the adult. (294, ellipsis in original)

In the repetition or refrain of "one," a singularity is produced along a plane of continuity according to proximity. Such deterritorialization of "the (classical) body" is always already occurring, though it is controlled and reterritorialized by vertical planes of development, organization, and human representation. Throughout Deleuze and Guattari's work, music is both a line of escape for voice and it is a means for becoming. Particularly, the "refrain" is important, because only through its original variability may a theme be organized--may come to be. As with translation, the trace of a becoming is marked by the occurrence of replies. The nature of these replies may be territorialized according to various levels of organization (being-animal, being-human, being-woman, being-male, and the most

totalizing of all, Law, or, being-"man"), but the priority of the creation and joining of beings by affects and finitudes is an always already present condition through which beings speak.

Deleuze and Guattari's work represents a major attempt to think the joining of beings beyond that which we normally think in terms of language. "Language" and, more generally, affect, in their work constitutes "communities" which are not limited by categories of the understanding. Instead, "community" is the term for a substantive multiplicity of becomings immanent to any being in the world. Their work allows a radical rereading of finitude away from "man," and of in-formational lines away from systems, especially, systems of the understanding or "mind." They allow us to read the human in terms of a univocal expression of Being, rather than as a function of human understanding. In short, to think "community" according to a universal scale, somewhat in the manner of what Nancy has termed "infinite finitude."

Conclusion

Contrary to current ideology about the "information society"--supposedly, a global dialogue which is brought about by information technology and leads to a commmon global understanding--the notion of translation introduces a notion of an information community based upon the foundational ground of forces in-form-ing the relations and nature of beings. That is, the thinking through of translation is the thinking through of the in-forming becoming which is information, and this leads to a displacement of positive conceptions of "information-as-thing" or information as any simple totality of meaning. In the event of translation, formation and trans-formation are not to be forgotten.

Information in the post-modern community is not to-come, in the sense of a rational community that has been lost and will be found again if each "voice" expresses its "true" self. But rather, it is immanent in the abandonment of this metaphysics which composes modernity's sense of Being. Information's relation to community is announced in the appearance of what Nancy, Agamben, and Deleuze and Guattari refer to as "singularities," as such singularities mark an already present community in its becomings. Singularities develop out of affective becomings, and thus, singularities are not simple individualities, but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, they are substantive multiplicities. Agamben's warning is that the notion of "singularity" can, within a positivist discourse or a simply understood Enlightenment ideology, easily be changed into pluralism's "individual," which itself stands in a dialectical, and thus reflective, relation with the social totalism of fascism. This maintenance of the state or stasis within the micropolitics of the individual leads toward a microfascism of the self. Such a "self" is simply not possible when viewed from the perspective of affect and time. But the "self," conceived as an auto-affective individual, politically maintains itself against such a

critique by equating the abandonment of the Being of the classical subject with atheism and nihilism. The time for this, however, has already passed, and as Nancy writes, announces itself in terms of abandoned Being:

> We do not know it, we cannot really know it, but abandoned being has already begun to constitute an inevitable condition for our thought, perhaps its only condition. From now on, the ontology that summons us will be an ontology in which abandonment remains the sole predicament of being, in which it even remains--in the scholastic sense of the word--the transcendental. If being has not ceased to speak itself in multiple ways--pollakos legetai--abandonment adds nothing to the proliferation of this pollakos. It sums up the proliferation, assembles it, but by exhausting it, carrying it to the extreme poverty of abandonment. Being speaks itself as abandoned by all categories, all transcendentals.
>
> Abandoned being immobilizes the dialectic whose name means "the one that abandons nothing, ever, the one that endlessly joins, resumes, recovers." It obstructs or forsakes the very position, the initial position, of being...."

("Abandoned Being," 36-37)

Abandoned Being is read by humanism as the utmost sign of nihilism, because with its abandonment truth is grasped as lost. But it is this very abandonment which Kierkegaard, for example, favors in arguing against dialectic through the singular individual's im-possible move in faith; in other words, a fully necessary act of repetition which acknowledges that a true repetition contains the same unknowns and the same risks as the first one did. This is to argue that truth is never grasped, but instead, is the event of the necessary, and therefore, true. Such moments of continual rebirths of the world through repetition, through an eternal return of the infinite and the finite, are given the name in Heidegger's writings of "wiederholen," which summons the sense of a repetition which always already marks the difference which grounds it. What is communicated here and in Deleuze's works is a repetition which is never recoverable, an in-forming which is never closable and which continually, in a multiplicity of spaces and times, occurs, creating speeds, intensities, and the advent of bodies.

Abandoned Being means first of all a Being which marks humans only in terms of the animal, and ultimately, in terms of the open, becoming totality of physis. The propriety of singularity in regard to the animal goes deeper than liberal "rights," because it demands utmost regard to finitude and specificity at each and every moment. Its demands cannot be recuperated in dialectical or binary terms of the "one" or the "other" but must be in regard to an all without capitalization or closure, without reifying any singular appearance in terms of "such and such," but in full attention to the specificity of affects and appearance.

In-formation thus extends beyond the possibility of any system or modality of knowledge or Being. In a sense, it speaks, extremely simply, only Being itself. Today, the ethical demand is the unforgetting of these infinite finitudes.

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