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Psychoanalysis as Critique in the Works of Freud, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of psychoanalysis is important in this book on the critical theory of Library and Information Science (LIS) for three reasons: first, it is important to account for the prevalence and possible roles and issues involved with personal psychology and social psychology as cornerstone perspectives in LIS (vis-à-vis the cognitive turn and information seeking behavior, respectively); second, to account for the prevalence and importance of psychoanalysis in some of the French theorists who are of concern in this book; and third, to suggest, through a discussion of psychoanalysis, the overall importance of discursive psychological accounts in LIS. Discursive psychological accounts contain a model of formal causality that allows us to understand human identity, intention, and signification or meaning (in events such as information or knowledge) as constructed emergences and expressions that are achieved through cultural forms acting as affordances[1] in social situations. In LIS, such a framework does away with the metaphysics of viewing information as empirical or pseudoempirical objects (i.e., the realist conception of information [see Frohmann 2004]). It challenges cognitive psychology and philosophies of mind based on such a metaphysics and its corresponding epistemologies and methods (cf. Harré and Secord 1972). Psychoanalysis is probably one of the earliest, and certainly, one of the most famous examples of discursive psychology in the history of modern psychology. The cornerstone of its theory of mind is that of the developmental acquisition of experiences, from childhood on, as affordances for the subject's expressions, and its clinical activities aim toward the positioning of the subject's desire and personal drives issuing from these (particularly, traumatic) experiences within sociocultural norms of expressive possibility, particularly through language.

In this chapter, we will discuss important concepts in the works of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. If space were to allow it, we could extend this discussion to the place of psychoanalysis in the work of Jacques Derrida, on

the one hand, and, on the other hand, the relation of psychoanalysis to discursive psychology, proper. Unfortunately, we do not have space for these discussions, but what we will do is to present some essential concepts in the writings of the above authors and suggest ways in which these concepts can critique and/or aid LIS theory and practice. Our chosen authors consist of the founder of psychoanalysis and three more radical interpreters of psychoanalysis in the French tradition.

Psychoanalysis contrasts most strongly with the psychological emphasis in LIS during the past 30 years termed the cognitive approach, associated with the works of Nicholas Belkin, Peter Ingwersen, and others. In contrast to the cognitive approach, psychoanalysis understands the psychological subject to be culturally and socially constructed at various levels of determination. This understanding, however, makes psychoanalysis a theory that is allied with discursive psychology, proper, positioning theory, and other psychological approaches that emphasize language as a cultural and social formal affordance for action, rather than as either a container or conduit of meaning or as representational material for so-called "cognitive processing."

THE COGNITIVE TURN IN LIS

Nick Belkin, Peter Ingwersen—and with an emphasis on traditional concepts of emotions, the work of Carol Kuhlthau—and others gave a psychological emphasis to LIS with their cognitive approach. This approach differed from the earlier work in information retrieval, often traced to the Cranfield experiments of the late 1950s, in that it attempted to take into account mental models and other psychological elements and events in those subjects that are commonly referred to in the LIS literature as information users. More recent research trends in LIS have involved information seeking behavior which, as it has often been said, has taken such studies out of the laboratory and into other social contexts, thus expanding the concept of information to include events that stand outside of information retrieval, proper. A recent book by Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005) has attempted to reconcile these two approaches.

The core assumptions of Belkin's cognitive approach in his theory of Anomalous States of Knowledge (ASK) follow two metaphors: first, that information is transmitted from a "generator" to a receiver (qua person) and, second, that information is some sort of quasi-empirical entity (traditionally called *qualia* in the philosophy of mind—short for qualitative feelings) that fills in knowledge gaps in a user's mental "state" (Belkin 1977, 1990). ASK, as part of an Information Retrieval (IR) theory, understands information as something contained in documents and as something transmitted to minds. These two governing metaphors, respectively, are the conduit or transmission metaphor of information and communication, and, the form-content metaphor for how meaning is embedded in documents and in people's minds (i.e., information understood as "epistemic content," as Frohmann [2004] calls it). Here, LIS's cognitive approach follows earlier cognitive psychology in its modeling of the mind as an information processing mechanism.

It is not possible within the short span of this chapter to critique the two metaphors operating in ASK (for such, see Frohmann 1992, 2004; Day 2005, 2007). We should mention, however, that despite appearing to support the above epistemology in the first chapter of his 1992 work Ingwersen then writes in the next chapter of that book that this is not how the cognitive approach should be understood: rather, information should be understood as the effects of stimuli upon a person so that his or her cognitive state changes.

The latter part of this observation, that external stimuli have a possible bearing upon the present or future behavior of an organism, whether limited or not to IR situations, is common sense, and it is dubious whether such an observation is in need of a theoretical statement or that such phenomena, when encountered in other than enigmatic events, are in need of scientific methods or even conceptual analysis. In contrast, our interest in psychoanalysis will be, in part, with how 'external stimuli' and 'internal mental states' and processing may be theorized in ways that problematize the internal/external divide that is often assumed throughout the LIS tradition. In this, psychoanalysis largely shares with other types of discursive psychology the assumption that the cause of personal expressions—that is, the activities that we associate with the term *mind*—are to be sought in a person's use of the tools of cultural forms and in a person's learned social actions performed in social situations, rather than in private mental events, which in the LIS/Information Science cognitivist traditions are characterized as being caused by brain activities or symbol processing. To those who object to this view of mind by arguing that thought is not expressive, we suggest that what is often called thought is simply auto-affective expression by means of subvocalization, dreams, and so forth, and therefore, 'thought,' too, must be considered as expression by the processes that we have outlined. The subvocalization of language in reading is a demonstration of this.

SIGMUND FREUD

Sigmund Freud's name is so well known world wide that he needs little introduction. In Anglo-American countries, orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis largely has been supplanted by mixed methods (discursive, behavioral, and psycho-pharmaceutical) in clinical activities. Our concern here, however, is largely with understanding psychoanalysis as a theory of culturally and socially constructed subjectivity.

The most important of the psychoanalytical premises is that the forces that direct our psychological functions are not directly observable and must be inferred from the evidence of a person's behavior, foremost, from their language expressions. In the Freudian corpus, these forces are located in the unconscious (*das Unbewusste*), which is the core function or faculty in the Freudian understanding of mind. Following Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 449–53), we will propose that the Freudian corpus may best be dealt with as historically divided by two "topographies"—two geographies of envisioning the mind. The first, dating from *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900; Freud 1960a) through the early 1920s (though having earlier precedent in Freud's psycho-physiological ruminations in his correspondence with his fellow physician Wilhelm Fleiss at the end of the 19th century), is a psychodynamic theory of the unconscious, whereby the mind is envisioned as a product of cultural forms and social forces.

By the time of the publication of Freud's *The Ego and the Id* in 1923 (Freud 1962), this topography had been replaced by the second topography, that of the Ego (*das Ich*—literally, "the I"), the Id (*das Es*—literally, "the it"), and the Super-Ego (*das Über-Ich*—literally, the "Over-I"). While these three concepts can still be understood dynamically, in the second topography as compared to the first topography, there is (1) a greater emphasis placed upon conceiving of the unconscious as a product of infantile life-forces; and (2) a greater emphasis placed upon describing the mind in terms of quasi-anatomical psychological faculties. From the viewpoint of a discursive psychology, this shift toward the triadic topography is problematic, but it also is more closely aligned with the development of psychology after Freud in that

it sought to locate psychological functions in quasi-anatomical faculties, analogous to, or sometimes said to originate in, particular brain regions.

Whether understood largely as a dynamic product of social and cultural forces or as a product of social and cultural forces mixed with strong primitive infantile drives organized into distinct mental faculties, the Freudian concept of the unconscious involves several concepts that clearly distinguish it from later cognitivist models of mental functions and which pose challenges to the cognitive approach in LIS.

First, is the notion of deferred action (*Nachträglichkeit*). The Freudian concept of the unconscious stresses that the unconscious is fully (primary repression) or partially (secondary repression) composed of social impacts or traumas that later form for the person his or her core cultural forms and social rules for expression and agency, as well as form the preconscious screens that then allow for additional learning and socialization in certain directions of development rather than others (Freud 2003).

In Freud's writings, deferred action seems to be understood as operating in two temporal directions. In the first, core experiences are remembered and then latter reinvested in understanding new stimuli. This is a developmental analogue to the Kantian notion of formal conditions for the understanding. In the second, past experiences are reworked according to present experiences (though the degree that this is possible differs as to whether the past experiences are subject to primary or secondary repression).

The Freudian concept of the unconscious and its accompanying concepts muddy any simple understanding of information as some sort of immediately understood stimuli. According to psychoanalysis, meaningful events are products of faculties and frames of understanding based on earlier experiences, some of which may be understood by asking a person why he understands something or by watching what he does when he understands something. In the psychoanalytic session, however, where the subject's thought is assumed to be less logical than normal—involving greater use of symbolic condensation (what in Lacan's work is understood as metaphor) and displacement (what in Lacan's work is understood as metonymy)—the subject's discourse is assumed to require some degree of analysis in order to return it to a logically consistent language. If the historical origins of cognitive psychology are to be found in those attempts to see the mind as a rational processing mechanism made up of logical operations, the Freudian model states that though a rational function of the mind may be optimal, it is far from normal, particularly so in early life. Further, the cognitive division between supposed external stimuli and supposed internal processing is greatly muddied in the Freudian account of the unconscious, wherein stimuli are said to form the basis for the self and its action. Other Freudian concepts, such as identification and object-cathexis, based on mimetic relations to persons and fetishistic relations to objects, further challenge a naïve realist or naïve empiricist concept of information.

Thus, the assumption that information is then incorporated into 'knowledge states' as a part is absorbed into a whole—as in Belkin's ASK—might be seen as a rather crude and simplistic understanding of cognition in contrast to Freud's theoretical toolkit (we might say the same about LIS's famous data-information-knowledge-wisdom pyramid). If we were to object that Belkin and Ingwersen's theories were limited to describing the formation of mental models involved in information retrieval situations, we would then have to ask if the psychoanalytic description of mental processes could be excluded from these situations. In Freud's works, needs are functions of desires and drives and cannot be easily separated from those desires and drives.

The Freudian model was a radical break from earlier psychological behaviorism in so far as it stressed the importance of scripts, narratives, and the topographies of mentality in the formation of what some would call "information" for the subject. In distinction to LIS's cognitive model, it suggests an understanding of information and information seeking that recognizes the retroactive and revisionary nature of thought and it recognizes that thought processes are not always rational. The Freudian model also recognizes that needs are situated within larger desires, whose logic may not be immediately recognized or reportable, or for Freud, consciously accessible. The psychoanalytic therapeutic situation is, indeed, the site of the working out of how the logic of needs can reflect the irrationality of desires. Finally, the Freudian model challenges any easy distinction between internal mental states and external stimuli. In both the first and the second topographies, the unconscious and its expressions are a product of experience. The Freudian model is, foremost, a model of developmental psychology.

As Tuominen (1997), suggests, most information situations, such as reference interviews, do not need the therapeutic model that has been offered in LIS. Thus, the contribution of psychoanalysis to LIS may be seen not in furthering a misplaced therapeutic practice, but rather, in its critique of the empiricist and cognitivist conceptions of information in LIS's cognitive and information seeking behavior theories. In the next two sections we will briefly survey the possible contributions to LIS theory and practice of the works of three other psychoanalytical theorists, those being Jacques Lacan, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

JACQUES LACAN

Lacan was born in 1901 and, like Freud, was a physician by training. Though he was a colorful and controversial character and a rather eclectic scholar, he had a great influence on French psychoanalysis, both advocating a return to Freud and representing a challenge to the orthodox institutions and interpretations of psychoanalysis that formed after Freud's death. Lacan's interpretation of psychoanalysis was influenced by both structural linguistics and by his studies of Hegel from the lectures of Alexandre Kojève.

For Lacan, the unconscious is not part of a topographical structure hidden away in a faculty of a subject's mind, but rather, it is the totality of the "Other." "Other" (*Autre* in French) is the social whole, particularly as embodied in language, rather than any one person, particularly as a reflection of the ego (an "other" with a small "o" or in French, the *petit a* [*autre*]).[2] In this, Lacan returns more to the dynamic theories of Freud's first topography rather than the faculty psychology of Freud's second topography. Further, the goal of Lacanian analysis is not to discover the drives of primitive instincts as they are manifested in individual desires, but rather, to understand the relation between the patient's desires and normative sociocultural actions and forms of expression, that is, to understand one's subjectivity within what in Lacan's oeuvre is termed "the symbolic order."

In Lacan's work, the concept of the drive loses much of its Freudian biological intonations. For Lacan, drives are functions of desires, which, in turn, must pass through cultural and social mediations. For example, in as much as the patient is stuck in a rather infantile mode of narcissistic behavior—what in Lacan's oeuvre is characterized as "the mirror stage," dominated by the imaginary order—the patient's imagination of himself or herself and the world as a reflection of the ego is, however, still mediated by

language, though a relatively private language. In other words, using Lacan's terminology, the imaginary order is not completely separable from the symbolic order. In this way, Lacan's reading of Freud distanced psychoanalysis from the latter's biological reductionism. By understanding the mind as a linguistic and communicative product and agent, Lacan's work, even more than Freud's, provides theoretical tools for understanding 'information phenomena' as products of society and culture.

The concept of desire is important in Lacan's work, and it influenced theoretical French psychoanalysis and the work of Deleuze and Guattari. (We will soon examine the work of the latter theorists.) The French translation (*désir*) of Freud's term *Wunsch* (wish) is shaped in Lacan's work by the influence of Hegel's dialectic, which in turn, is part of the German idealist philosophical tradition—a tradition that understands human life in terms of drives (*Trieb*). (Lacan's interpretation of drive as life force, rather than as (biological) instinct, thus pushed a close French variation of this important term in the German intellectual tradition against the prevalent interpretation in English-dominated orthodox psychoanalysis, in whose texts Freud's terms *Instinkt* and *Trieb* are interchangeably translated.) Desire is the force between the subject and the object by which the subject then comes to realize him- or herself. Whereas Freud's German term has a sense of the subject's own fantasy, the French term emphasizes the concept of a force that binds the subject to the object and, through the object, to its own development or becoming. In Lacan's work, desire is a product of dialectic and it constitutes the subject through his or her experiences in the world.

Maturation, for Lacan, means being aware that others are not just different than one's self, but that they are constituted by an alterity—not only as other, but as Other—that cannot be brought within the self's control. This same Otherness also makes the self something other than an ego. *Désir* conceives of the subject as constructed by social relations and cultural forms—most importantly, through language. It is because Lacan conceives the subject to be constituted by means of the social and cultural whole that Lacan could famously state that, "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other" (2006a). Otherness (with a capital "O") speaks, in a sense, to the subject so that the subject may reply, and therefore, speak.

For Lacan, a subject's desire is demonstrated by the chain of signification in his or her speech, showing the unconscious in the discourse of language through the formulation of the relationship S/s (Signifier over signified—reversing Saussure's formulation of the signified over the signifier since, for Lacan, it is the chain of signification that produces the signified).[3] Visually, this formula depicts the signified beneath the bar, the latter of which represents the unconscious. The figurative depiction represents the relationship between Signifier and signified, while also noting the critical separation between them. In this sense, the chain of signification is demonstrative of the subject's desire in that the Signifier implies another Signifier, which in turn implies another and so forth, in a potentially endless movement of deferment, thereby forming the chain of signification (Evans 1996; Lacan 2006b).

The understanding of the subject's relationship to the object though desire is not only indebted to dialectics, but also derives from the psychoanalytic notion of the part-object, wherein parts of an object come to substitute for the whole of that object.[4] The part-object plays the role of functioning as a lure for the subject's desire. One of the classic psychoanalytic part-objects is the mother's breast, but the term more generally refers to any secondary object that becomes the object of desire. In Lacan, the object of desire is always partial, first, because as it is held within the domain of desire its meaning is constituted as a function of desire (that is, its ontology is partially symbolic and imaginary, in addition to being constituted by whatever physical properties the object

might have if it is other than a semantic object), and second, because, as it still remains an object proper, it never allows for the completion of desire, but instead, institutes the logic within the subject of desire-desiring-desire, which means that in the subject his or her own desire is a life force only as it is partially suppressed and ultimately unfulfilled. (The subject's desire, thus, can be self-suppressing—most fully charging itself, in a sense, via its own partial self-denial, that is, the subject giving to him- or herself an impossible object of desire.) In this, the part-object—increasingly understood by Lacan in his works as the *objet petit a*—is similar because of its symbolic and imaginary constitution to the Marxist concept of the commodity, in as much as commodities are lures into possibilities of being and action, but are ultimately, in a sense, unfulfilling. The *objet petit a* is shared, and links, the three orders that Lacan calls the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real: it is a function of the imaginary to the extent that we desire someone, something, or some situation like what we imagine we are or should be; it is a function of the symbolic insofar as it carries us through different symbolic worlds; and it marks the presence of the real in as much as it shows itself as that which cannot represent our desire (in the dual sense that Lacan uses the term *the real* in his works: as an empirical reality that exceeds the subject's desire and as the primal trauma and its drives that anchor the subject's desire to empirical reality [see Žižek 1989]).

These formulations imply a great deal for LIS, and for Information Science (IS), as well. For Lacan, speech is, above all, a reply to language—a reply that comes to orient the speech, or more generally, the expression of the subject. The problem of the neurotic, and even more, the psychotic, is that his or her speech is largely a reply to a relatively private language—an imaginary or hallucinatory realm, rather than what is publicly understandable. LIS's cognitive model and many of its information seeking epistemologies begin with the concept of a subject's needs and fulfilling those needs in document retrieval or information seeking behavior. What is not addressed at all or fully enough by such views is that "needs" are not mental states, nor are they fully subjective states, but rather, they are pragmatic events involving the subject's social and cultural positions, predominantly in terms of language, and the types and availability of materials that codetermine with the subject the means for expressions to take place. This suggests that the primary interest of information science is not 'information' per se, but rather, language in social actions and as cultural forms, as such codetermine subjects and objects. What might be considered to be information—as well as what might be considered to be the information seeker (or perhaps we should say in the psychoanalytic context, the information subject)—are functions of these affordances (not the least being the limitations of the social institutions and languages of the LIS cognitive and information seeking traditions). Lacanian psychoanalysis recognizes individual needs in desires, but it further recognizes that desires are drives that are formed and fulfilled by the subject's position in the symbolic.

From this perspective, the task of a librarian would be that of helping the subject to locate him- or herself in the orders of knowledge that make up the library and its languages and systems, and perhaps more importantly in the future, the universes of recorded information that extend beyond the locus of the library. In the most farsighted view of librarians as agents in the knowledge domain of what is sometimes called cyberspace, the librarian's task would become that of helping the subject to extend into and negotiate different communicational domains constituted by heterogeneous languages and cultures, and in this manner, to help the subject become the singular person that he or she is driven to be, as far as such is possible. (Such a concept of life, as that of becoming who one potentially is, reaches back into the earliest philosophical

concepts of the drive [in German, *Trieb*], in German idealist philosophy, such as the works of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.) While the former concept of the librarian's task represents a more conservative reading of Lacan's project in application to the practical library and information professions, the latter represents a more liberal reading of Lacan's project, allied with Deleuze and Guattari's understandings of radical psychoanalysis.

There is one, very direct, critical application of Lacanian theory to an LIS model, and that is to Belkin's ASK model. Belkin's model characterizes the needs of the user in terms of a lack in relation to his or her knowledge (Belkin 1977, 1990). From a Lacanian perspective, this need would be understood as a lack in relation to a symbolic order. The critical problem occurs in regard to ASK and related cognitivist discourses when these posit the so-called information need as something that (1) originates in the subject's mind, and (2) can be fulfilled by the correspondence of the subject's needs and the information object's 'content.' From a Lacanian perspective, the subject's needs arise from the situated nature of a person in the symbolic order. The subject must position his or her desires within a symbolic universe so that he or she can then accomplish some movement or task in a way that is not just narcissistic, but, at least potentially, practically understandable. The task of Lacanian psychoanalysis is, thus, tactical, not strategic; it does not seek to map the subject's supposed inner knowledge and to find its lacks so that these may then be fulfilled by the information supplied by the analyst or found in documents. Need requires, first of all, that the subject's desire be correctly positioned in the symbolic universe that it wishes to work within so that it may be expressed. This is to say that need is a function of the symbolic. One can only have a need that can be expressed.[5]

What the analyst provides is help for the subject in the subject's finding the materials that would act as affordances for a general desire of expression (the particular expressions—the needs—require the symbolic field to be present in order to even be expressed).[6] Analogously, indirect and direct information in libraries help the user in expressing him- or herself within a symbolic field—first of all, the language of library structures (subject classifications, subject headings, call numbers, etc.), and second, the field of knowledge that the user is trying to work through. The belief that either texts or persons have empirically locatable content would be, for Lacan, based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena of meaning and the concept of language. Texts must be read in order to say that they are meaningful. The knowledge that we say that a person has is understood by a performance; previous to this, such knowledge is hypothetical.[7]

In a sense, for Lacan, the nature of being human is that of always being in 'anomalous states.' The fulfillment of a lack is always a provisional and practical affair. However, it corresponds with the fundamental ontological lack that Lacan premises as the logical basis for desire and, thus, for human life understood according to desire. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the ultimate task of psychoanalysis for the neurotic patient is to show him or her that the fulfillment of lack is always temporary, that one's life is the force of desire.

GILLES DELEUZE AND FÉLIX GUATTARI

In contrast to Lacan's work, for the philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, especially in their joint works, the object or other (no matter

its ontological composition) is an "entranceway and exit" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 21) for the subject's desire, which the subject passes through in his or her historical events or what Deleuze and Guattari in their oeuvre term "becomings." Furthermore, the possibilities and potentialities for these investments and self-transformations come from sociocultural fields of semiotic and physical materials. Through sociocultural fields, as well as the physical properties of objects and beings, the subject invents him or herself.

How is it possible to pass through an *other* as an entranceway and exit, whether the other is a human being, another type of living being, or even an inanimate object (including technological objects)? Classically in orthodox psychoanalysis, identification, epitomized in Lacan's mirror stage, is the means by which one becomes through another. However, in Lacan, human maturation involves a greater involvement in symbolic, rather than specular, relations (that is, to use Lacan's terminology, greater involvement in the symbolic rather than the imaginary order). In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the neurotic is often seen as someone who misrecognizes the other as one's self (in the sense that the self is misunderstood to begin with: as a representation, rather than as hypothetical and real sets, respectively, of potential and actualized powers). In psychoanalysis, and particularly in Lacan's work, self-awareness is that of knowing that one's self is always mediated not only by other people, but by symbolic fields.

Rather than leaving the concept of the self at the doorstep of an ontologically split sense of self-identity and an ultimately futile sense of knowing the other as Other, however, Deleuze and Guattari see the self not as a being, but as a becoming, and they view the other as a means for this.[8] In this, they work out Lacan's ontological commitments further than, perhaps, Lacan did. Having already rejected the Cartesian self as part of an erroneous metaphysical tradition (extending, as they see it, through Hegel) that valorizes being over becoming, Deleuze and Guattari's works understand being as always provisional and derivative upon becomings. In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is the nature of life, and becoming is always that of processes of becoming through others. Despite this provisional nature of the self, however, maturity in Deleuze and Guattari is not a question of progressing from becomings to beings, but rather, of possessing the skills and opportunities to have greater choices in choosing types of becomings that may occur. While the self may be always already ontologically provisional, this doesn't make it any less existentially certain. One's potentialities are built from experiences and skills, though they are actualized and expressed only in given situations. Maturation is the ability to ask with more skill the questions, What is an entity for? and How can I make a relation with a person or object an event of personal and, even historical, significance? In contrast to Lacan's writings, the subject in Deleuze and Guattari's works is given much greater historical power, both personally and socially.

What Deleuze critiqued as the "the control society" (1995) is a type of social order that regiments becomings by means of controlling the variety and types of social actions, cultural forms, and even social situations that becomings may occur through, as well as socially marginalizing or demeaning particular objects, forms of subjectivity, and events. Deleuze and Guattari always stressed "transversal" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) becomings (that is, across, rather than within, normative regimes of identity and knowledge). For Deleuze and Guattari, social control acts, in part, by limiting the transversal relations through which these transversal "lines of flight" (1987) for a subject can occur. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari's works stress the transformative nature of affects and bodies and stress the pragmatic aspects of those relations and materials for the subject.

Deleuze's works on affects,[9] Guattari's essays contained in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics* (1984), and their coauthored works[10] present an understanding of subjectivity and developmental psychology that see affect (which in LIS is sometimes given the term *information*) as affecting what Deleuze and Guattari term in their oeuvre "molecular" identities of the mind/body. (Deleuze and Guattari's works don't assume a strict mind/body dichotomy.) Their valorization of persons as essentially molecular and mentally shaped by affects according to speeds and intensities (and only gradually becoming what Deleuze and Guattari term in their oeuvre "molar"—that is, the gradual assumption of relatively fixed identities and more individually shaped intentional gestures) presents an intriguing and largely uninvestigated psychological model for clinical and developmental psychologies. As undetermined affect, such an understanding of information (though Deleuze and Guattari don't call it information as such) avoids some of the theoretical problems of positing information-as-affect as quasi-empirical qualia of meaning or potential meaning used in 'mental processing.' It also presents new challenges and opportunities in psychology and information science. For example, music would need to be accounted for as affective information in a broader sense than is possible within the traditional grammars for feelings or emotions used within standard cognitivist, as well as popular, discourses of psychology. And so, too, what was known as group psychology could be understood according to social movements—literally, social movements or affects that shape the mind/body. The mind/body, here, is seen as relatively plastic, relatively more able to engage in mutual "lines of flight" through "transversal becomings" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) according to the openings to affect that a mind/body allows. The propensity of mature people toward representation and the propensity of children and adolescences toward affective states of moods and music are, in Deleuze and Guattari's works, given ontological and social explanations—explanations that as of now are still untapped resources for clinical and developmental psychologies, as well as for a philosophy of mind and, possibly, a new area of research in information science.

For Deleuze and Guattari's works, as for parts of Foucault's works, the English term *power* is a translation of two very different French terms: power understood as an expressive or emergent force (*puissance*), and, power understood as a repressive, institutionally structured force (*pouvoir*). Allied to Foucault's works, their critique of the cultural and institutional repressive powers of orthodox psychoanalysis (particularly in *Anti-Oedipus* [Deleuze and Guattari 1977]) aims at critiquing not only its macro-institutions of repressive power, but its support and reification of the micro-fascisms of sociocultural actions and expressions that prevent transversal movements and personal and social revolutions. Their critiques of the control society and the manner of its inscription upon individual psyches and bodies (not the least beginning with public information, knowledge structures, and education) opens up a vast critique of information and politics at the level of public institutions *and* everyday life that LIS has barely touched upon in its political amnesia, not least in regard to public information (which seems to be regarded by LIS institutions as the domain of journalism).

Due to space constraints we cannot discuss more fully the political aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's works.[11] However, Deleuze and Guattari's works stand apart from Lacan's in this regard by taking a much more radical stance toward the personally and socially constructive possibilities of subjectivity than Lacan's works did. Correspondingly, the task of the information provider within this view, for example, may be seen as a political task to foster personal and social change by challenging what may or may

not be considered to be information today, a challenge that might result in changing the trajectories and forms of political, social, and cultural subjects. In this, the information provider's job would be as transformational as the Deleuzian philosopher's job: not so much to literally preserve knowledge, but to transform it; not to simply repeat concepts, but to reinvent and invent them (see Gerolami 2009).

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEW MEDIA

Psychoanalysis as a theoretical and interpretive framework may elucidate the psychic and psychological underpinnings of the exponential growth and adoption of new media and information and communications technologies (ICTs), which are demonstrably of great interest to the field of LIS. As a framework, it may provide insight into how information is sought, accessed, and used, but also how information contributes to and is contributed to by particular information ecologies and circulates within them as informational communications.

According to Lacan, "The sender receives his own message from the receiver in an inverted form" (2006a). Critic Lorenzo Chiesa (2006) interprets Lacan's claim to be an expression of the movement in Lacan's oeuvre from a focus on the imaginary construction of identity within the individual (as exemplified in Lacan's mirror stage), toward a *transindividual* signification of identity through language (41). The inversion of the message, according to Chiesa, occurs in two forms: an *intersubjective* form, in which the speaker situates him or herself in relation to *another subject* that is the receiver of the message (he or she who is not I), and an *intrasubjective* inversion in which the receiver relays the message back to the sender who then receives it.

With regards to the Web 2.0 movement (and its various iterations), the critical point around which such developments revolve is the notion of interactivity: not only are individuals information seekers or users, but they are also contributors and responders through multiplied manners, expressing greater amounts of information. For example, the National Archives of the United Kingdom and a number of partner cultural institutions organized a Web-based resource in 2007 called *Moving Here: 200 Years of Migration to England* to highlight the history of immigration in the United Kingdom. In addition to online exhibitions of digitized archival materials, the resource also provides a means by which individuals can contribute their own personal histories and narrative experiences of migration. In doing so, a number of individuals contributing their testimonies noted that they were reminded of their own experiences in reading others' testimonies. Furthermore, this example also highlights the relationship between the subject and the Other, the latter in this case being marked through the symbolic significations of individuals' experiences. These experiences, constructed through signification in digital form online, speak to the subject, to which the subject replies. Such a framework may prove applicable to a number of other popular new media and Web 2.0 modes, like blogs and micro-blogs, social networking, and other interactive online resources not yet realized. Psychoanalysis, in stressing the communicative foundations and temporal nature of knowledge and subjectivity, provides a more complete theoretical toolbox for psychologically understanding communicative technologies than cognitivist information theories, which are psychological analogues of an information theory commonly (and often wrongly) used to describe traditional knowledge producers, readers, viewers (and other 'receivers'), and knowledge preserving institutions, such as libraries.

CONCLUSION

What are some of the major theoretical contributions of the psychoanalytic works that we have covered to a critical theory of LIS? Since critical theory is a product of critical philosophy (a term first used by Kant in his rejection of what he characterized as positive, dogmatic, medieval, and naïve empirical philosophies, and his attempt, instead, to articulate the a priori grounds for knowledge, ethical actions, and judgments of taste), the question becomes, following Kant's work and critical theory in the 20th century: *how does psychoanalysis—understood as a critical (rather than as a strictly clinical) discourse—turn us away from current theoretical dogmatisms in LIS and Information Science (IS) and how does it articulate, conceptual problems in these fields in other ways?*

Certainly the chief LIS dogmatism that is brought into *critique* by psychoanalysis is the epistemology of information seeking: namely, that information seeking starts with a subject searching for some type of information object which he or she then uses. The model that psychoanalysis proposes instead, particularly in Lacan and in Deleuze and Guattari's works, is that of a subject and object co-joined by language and other cultural forms, by social forces, and co-located in social situations. Both the subject and the information are mutual products of cultural forms for expressions, social forces, and social situations. The psychoanalytic concept of the object must be seen in terms of drive theories, where drives are understood as products of social forces and cultural forms for expression. The conditions of information 'use,' too, must be viewed in terms of social forces and cultural forms, though at times embedded within teleologically structured actions (what we commonly term tasks). Understanding subjects, objects, and use as co-afforded by social forces, cultural forms, and social situations allows us to understand others' explanations of their intentions and the reasons that they give for acts and actions, and to understand such explanations and reasons as normative, nonnormative, and problematic or not in terms of their likely fulfillment.

In sum, the conduit metaphor as the basis of information theory is critiqued in psychoanalysis by the view that the relation between the subject and object is a function of the subject and the object's position in sociocultural and physical spaces, and by the view that the acts of persons are explained by the cultural forms and social actions that are used by a person and which shape and determine the person's expressions. Among these forms are "information" forms for knowledge and for manners of communicating, and among the tools that are used are what are considered to be information and communication technologies. As any history of these terms shows, their meanings are quite variable. Along with the critique of the conduit metaphor comes a critique of the container metaphor for documentary or informational meaning in both documentary objects and in subjects: that is, a critique that highlights that documentary content is a product of reading and that a person's knowledge can only be hypothesized or indirectly evidenced (by school diplomas, etc.) until it is performed. Knowledge is not a contained substance in a form; for documents it is the performance of reading and for persons it is a performance of certain types of acts that we call knowing or knowledge acts (Day 2005, 2007). *Content is the product of, not the cause for,* acts of reading and personal expression.

Second, the concept of desire in psychoanalysis encompasses the entire social and cultural fields of subjects and objects. Particularly in Lacan's works, the elevation of objects to, at least, some degree of investments of desire means that objects, including information technologies, must be understood, at least in part, as functions of symbolic

investments. This is important not only in analyses of the meaning of the terms *information society* and *information age,* and for understanding the nature of certain technologies privileged in such societies, but it is also important for understanding objects and their historical and social design trajectories according to personal and social dreams and desires (for example, understanding whatever is meant, today, by the class term *computers* according to symbolic investments, rather than according to technological qualities alone).

On the one hand, the Lacanian concept of the symbolic, led by the *objet petit a,* encompasses both the field of the subject's desire and it allows for the social construction of subjects as groups around common symbolic objects. As we have suggested in an endnote in this chapter, the concept of the *objet petit a,* as a symbolic projection ultimately originating in the Other, anticipates what Serres and Latour later termed in their works the "quasi-object." The *objet petit a* is both the cause and the subsequent lure for the subject's desires; it begins at the point of trauma where the real creates the subject through an enigmatic incident that the subject spends a lifetime and his or her drives trying to conceptually grasp (for Freud, the pleasure principle is, ultimately, the other side of the death instinct; that is, our lives are spent chasing the enigma of our finitude). On the other hand, in terms of the object, the materiality of objects becomes, in part, the resistance that they have to purely imaginative and symbolic investments. In short, much of the discourse on information and information technologies, users, and information use, as well as such tropes as the information society and the information age, beg for an analysis as to their imaginary, symbolic, and real qualities. One may argue that such a project is at the heart of a critical information theory as a type of social informatics.

Third, psychoanalysis proposes a concept of mind made up of personalized expansive cultural forms and learned social actions. This concept of mind gives rise to psychoanalysis's conception of self, as an agent whose present and future actions are intrinsically afforded by past experience and learning. Parallel to Glenberg and Robertson (1999), Day (2007) has referred to these lattices of cultural forms and learned actions as "indexes" that position the subject in social space and are developmentally extended by analogical learning. Such a model stands against cognitivist models of the mind as an information processing mechanism of symbols or representations.

Fourth, psychoanalysis challenges the temporality of LIS's information seeking model and the ontology of information as presence. It suggests that understanding can be retroactive. It also suggests that what is most informative for the subject is often what is not consciously present. Freud's paradigm examples for this last concept are his notions of the slip of the tongue (1960a) and of jokes as the gateway to the unconscious (1960b). In jokes, for Freud, what is most important is often what is not at first evident, but which later appears—for example, in the punch line of a joke (where the non-expected, commonly minor, meaning of a term or line of thought suddenly occurs as dominant). In psychoanalysis, the most important information is not always what the subject thinks that he or she is seeking, but what appears in the midst of the seeking and is often of an opposite value to what is initially being sought. In other words, information in psychoanalysis is often not manifest, but rather latent (this point is highlighted, by Lacan, among other places, in Lacan 2006c, and by Žižek, in, among other places, Žižek 1989.)

Fifth, despite the prominence of subjectivity in psychoanalysis's concept of desire (particularly in points of Lacan's works and certainly in Deleuze and Guattari's joint works), psychoanalysis sometimes shows the possibility of its being a psychological theory based on the "mediation" (Ekbia 2009) of subjects and objects by one another

in the establishment of each other's identities. Rather than stressing the identity of the subject or object as in-itself essences, being is developed from out of the in-between, relational, spaces, in and through which subjects and objects create their singularities and from which identities might be subsequently recognized and represented. Such in-between spaces are constructed through social and physical mediation and remediation and, semantically, through the mediation and remediation of cultural forms in such events as conversation. The subject and the object are seen in such a view as mutually afforded (by each other and by the common grounds through which they emerge and interact). Their codetermination leads to their emergences as affected *singularities,* and, when and if they are recognized as certain types of beings or objects, then their represented identities give them their status as *individuals.* Thus, subjects and objects and their relations to one another are to be understood according to determinate (Aristotle: efficient) causes in their interactions, but this is underwritten more fundamentally by formal causes or forms for expression. Subjects and objects are coemergent from out of in-common cultural forms for meaning, meaningful social actions, and social situations (as well, of course, from out of in-common physical affordances if the relation is not purely semiotic). In information environments, as we have suggested, such coemergence is seen most richly in environments where subjects change each other and change their modes of expression (i.e., their so-called information environments), for example, in some Web 2.0 environments that stress communication, rather than information display and retrieval functions. Deleuze and Guattari's works see the codetermination of subjects and objects by one another through their mutual affects, their shared situations, and their in-common becomings as having consequences reaching into the physical characteristics of beings. Certainly, theirs is a long-term evolutionary view.

In sum, the psychoanalytical works that we have discussed, understood as critical (rather than strictly clinical) discourses, challenge the epistemology of LIS's cognitive models, its information seeking epistemology, its dominant metaphors (the conduit metaphor and the form-content metaphor), its ontological and metaphysical understanding of subjects, and its predominant causal model. It challenges IS's cognitivist theories of mind (as in traditional Artificial Intelligence), its dominant reliance upon determinist causal models for understanding human-technological relations (and the quantitative methods that support them), as well as its neglect in not more clearly addressing information technology as cultural forms that enact symbolic futures. In contrast to both LIS and IS theories of mind, retroactive temporality is accounted for and the term *information* is understood in terms other than that of immediately recognized knowledge or Frohmann's (2004) "epistemic content." The psychoanalytic works that we have discussed offer an understanding of subjects and objects in terms of their mutual constructions and in terms of mutual affordances, they offer a theoretical model that challenges both the mind/body and the inner/outer dichotomies that are prevalent in the Western metaphysical and modern psychological traditions, and they stress a developmental rather than an information processing basis for understanding mind and cognition. In brief, the psychoanalytical discourses that we have examined constitute one set of answers to some of the many a priori, conceptual paradoxes and confusions that plague LIS and IS theory and, consequently, their empirical research and professional practices.

Last, in terms of practical activities involving LIS institutions, perhaps one of the greatest contributions of psychoanalytic discourse is in the theoretical inflection point that attempts to reconceptualize the relationship between the professional field and the varying communities that it aims to serve. Although there may be a tacit, or at least

largely unaddressed, recognition that the leveraging of ICTs for information services can be of great benefit for libraries and other information institutions, psychoanalysis gestures toward the intersubjective construction of meaning, identity, and intention, beyond what cognitive psychology and information theories exposit. At the least, for research in this field, psychoanalysis provides a framework by which to critically read information phenomena in manners that move away from the privileged social science perspectives that have pervaded the discipline and the metaphysics of subjectivity that philosophically inform them. Such a framework allows for the excavation of information phenomena in terms that LIS broadly has yet to interrogate.

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NOTES

1. We use the term *affordance* to mean cultural and social materials ("social substances" from Harré 2002) that afford the emergence of meaningful expressions, including those of selves as particular singularities. Primarily, we refer to cultural affordances (such as language), but also to social actions, as well, and when applicable, to physical ("material") affordances. The concept of affordance is related to Aristotle's notion of formal causes (rather than determinate ["efficient"] causes), referring to forms that afford meaningful expressions and emergences by shaping the expressive powers of a substance (including persons). These, latter, too, of course, may be considered to be affordances, but of a physiological or psychological type related to, respectively, empirically recognizable or hypothetical innate powers and dispositions of a substance, rather than what might be seen as those contextual affordances that we have characterized above. Of course, with learned behaviors, contextual affordances play a great role in forming those innate powers and dispositions proper to a person.

Our understanding of this term is greatly shaped by Rom Harré's works where notions of disposition, powers, and more recently, properly, the term affordance are foundational. (See Harré and Secord 1972; Harré and Gillett 1994; and Harré 2002, being only a few of his many works where cultural and social affordances are discussed; many other of his works discuss material affordances in regard to the analysis of natural objects in the physical sciences). The term originates in the works of J. J. Gibson, of course, but Harré has greatly broadened and philosophically deepened it, and we are profoundly indebted to Harré's broad, extensive, and brilliant scholarship. We might note in the context of this chapter in this book that Gilles Deleuze's expressionist philosophy shares with Harré's works a concern with the powers of substances and the cultural, social, and material forms through which substances are expressed, but it is much more general than Harré's more analytical works. Also, Antonio Negri's works, particularly his works on Spinoza's philosophy, take Deleuze's expressionist philosophy in an overtly political direction.

2. Lacan replaces the Freudian topographical mental faculty *structures* (a metaphor borrowed from geography) with topological *functions* (a metaphor borrowed from mathematics). This switch demonstrates Lacan's turn to a functionalist and symbolic basis for psychology and the identity of both subjects and objects, rather than one grounded in faculty psychology. Arguably, this can be seen as somewhat of a return to Freud's earlier, relatively more dynamic topography (from about 1900 to 1923), as compared to the later Freudian faculty psychology of the second topography. For commentary on this, see the entry "topology" in Dylan Evans' reliable *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (1996).

3. In Saussure's works, the word *signifier* refers to words and the word *signified* refers to concepts.

4. A historical account of the trajectory of the concept of the psychoanalytic part-object (particularly explicit in Melanie Klein's works) to Winnicott's "transitional objects" to Lacan's *objet petit a* to what Serres and Latour have termed "quasi-objects" and the role of objects as

"entranceways and exits" for desire in Deleuze and Guattari is given in Day 2001 (chapter 4, particularly page 75 and following), within an account of information and information technology as projected desire and in that chapter, particularly, in regard to Pierre Lévy's misleading appropriation of key concepts in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. For more on part-objects as quasi-objects, particularly in relation to digital objects, see Ekbia's (2009) engaging analysis. A collection of accounts of information technologies as types of part-objects is given by Sherry Turkle under the term "evocative objects" (Turkle 2007)—we may recall that Turkle's first book was on Lacan.

5. The English grammar of "having" a need misleads us to think that needs precede their forms of expression. Needs, however, are functions of what can be done and expressed. The private language of the schizophrenic or neurotic is only relatively private—there is no strictly private (i.e., personal) language. Wittgenstein, of course, gave exemplary critiques of the grammar of "to have" mental faculties and contents, as well as gave critiques of private language arguments.

6. We shouldn't lose sight that Lacan's psychoanalysis, picking up some strands in Freud's work, remains grounded in a romantic conception of life as a historical drive whose being is worked out by means of actions and events—that is, by becomings. Whether the subject's primal desire is to be understood in terms of a teleological sense of becoming or whether life-as-desire is to be understood as composed of a series of phases or even as the sum total of needs seems to be unresolved in Lacan's works, though the foundational concept of desire as a sort of primary drive certainly suggests the first or second understanding, rather than the last.

7. For more on a relevant, though nonpsychoanalytical explanation of this last point, see Harré 1989.

8. Having rejected Hegel's philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari don't premise an Otherness (in Hegel, Being) as a driving force for the subject's desire (in Hegel, grasped in Absolute Being [i.e., the identity of the particular and the universal] and in Lacan, never graspable). Rather, for Deleuze, Being is immanent—it is a potentiality that is actualized through events, rather than the teleological driver and achievement of personal and historical becoming (as in Hegel's philosophy) or the foundation and ultimate object for desire (as in Lacan's works).

9. Though this theme is important throughout his oeuvre, see particularly Deleuze's, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (2003) and *Bergsonism* (1991).

10. Particularly, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) and *What Is Philosophy?* (Deleuze and Guattari 1994).

11. We should note that Deleuze's and particularly Guattari's political work extended to collaborations with Antonio Negri, Franco Berardi (particularly concerned with new media forms), and others in the Italian *autonomia* ("autonomous Marxism") tradition (see Goddard n.d.; Guattari and Negri 1990; Deleuze and Negri 1995; Negri 1995; Dyer-Witheford 1999; Wright 2001, 2006; Berardi 2008).