

“Surface”: Material Infrastructure for Space

Ronald E. Day, Wayne State University

Abstract

This paper proposes that the concept of “surface” may be useful for conceiving of space as the product of the relation of powers and materials, rather than simply as the “background” for such. The paper proposes an immanent notion of power and an affective and expressive role for materials—infrastructure--in the creation of identity, structure, and space. The paper discusses expressive notions of power and being through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Rom Harré in its first part, and in the second part it discusses several qualities that could be associated with the concept of “surface.”

I. Introduction

Conceptual analyses operating in largely, so-called, “empirical,” “quantitative” fields in the social sciences have several functions. They may trace the development of an idea through history or synchronically across different institutional practices. They may critically analyze foundational concepts used in empirical studies. And, finally conceptual analyses may be used toward the deployment of new concepts used for further study. These roles cannot be performed empirically and must be done conceptually. This paper engages in the last approach and does so with an eye toward developing an ontology and an epistemology of agency following an expressionistic philosophy. It develops a model of agency and structure using the concept of “surface” to articulate the strata through which agency comes to be and structure is created. The notion of “surface” gives a materialist understanding to human agency in space. Surfaces express agency as material events and express structure according to repetitions and folds. Surfaces may be defined as the material grounds through which agencies gain and exhibit expressions in manners appropriate to their potentials. They may also be considered as contributors to the future potential of agencies. “Surface” denotes a materialist, rather than a structuralist, interpretation of “context,” which is understood as a constitutive and formal, rather than as a strictly efficient and determinate, cause of expression.

II. Agency

The concept of “surface” is important for considering problems of space, foremost, that of agency, its expressions, and accompanying “internal” and “external” forces and structures. Though the problem of agency in space has lately been exhaustively studied in empirical studies relating users to various technologies and physical structures, a more fundamental exploration of what it means for agency to express itself through corporeal and incorporeal bodies is needed. A topological concept such as “surface” can help us to conceptualize the relation between agency and social structure from the viewpoint of measure and directionality and mediations that both allow and restrict the freedom and expressions of agencies. This paper falls into two parts: in the first part, I examine the agent’s expression and social emergence through incorporeal and corporeal material surfaces; in the second part I look at various qualities of such surfaces. If the first part follows the relation of agency and emergence, the second part follows the disciplining or control of agency according to various structural surfaces of emergence originating from the relation of one body with another.

In recent memory, the work of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze constitutes a site for discussions of the concept of “surface,” but this work also joins with various other philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism, 18th century Scottish philosophy, some parts of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and with discussions of emergence and expression from the physical sciences. Though this paper does not concern itself with Deleuze’s work in detail, the concept of “surface” in this analysis owes much to it and thus it is proper to highlight his work, particularly in regard to Deleuze’s 1969 book, *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, 1988). Some aspects of this work have common ground with other philosophers during the same period, such as the work of Rom Harré (Harré and Madden, 1975; Harré, 2001), with, perhaps, a common thread in the 18th century Scottish philosophical and natural science traditions of emergent powers. This isn’t to argue that there are not differences between Deleuze and Harré’s writings, of course, but rather, to suggest that the works of these two representatives of different philosophical traditions (one more “continental,” the other more “Anglophone”) have strong overlaps in terms of thinking about agency in terms of immanent powers of expression and formal events of expression.

The essentially two-part structure to this essay echoes a dualism of human subjectivity that is present in both Deleuze and Harré’s works, namely, the difference between a unity of potentiality and intentionality (a primary realm or system) on the one hand, and that of public manifestations and accountability (a secondary realm or system) on the other. In terms of subjectivity, in Deleuze’s *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, 1988), the primary realm is often (though not consistently I read) associated with the term “person” (Harré’s (1989) “self”), and the secondary realm is often associated with the term, “individual” (Harré’s (1989), “person”). As I am using it, the concept of “surface” is, thus, meant to convey the area where bodies affectively and effectively intermingle and mix with one another. In Harré’s work, and in a more complex way, in Deleuze’s work as well, the former realm is inferred through efficient causal relations, in a manner of speaking, read in reverse. In Harré’s work, the self, (pace Kant’s unity of apperception) is a transcendental

unified used to explain intentional causality analogous to how hypothetical physical entities are conceptually proposed to explain specific physical effects (for example, the concept of “gravity” used as a causal explanation for the downward force of attraction between the earth and another body). In Deleuze’s work, reversed causal inferences are used to propose a state of creative possibility (in Deleuze and Guattari (1983), a “body without organs”). In both cases what is important is that a body is explained, on the one hand as potentialities toward being and, on the other, as an expressed and socially accountable body (a “person” in Harré’s terms, an individual in Deleuze’s works, or a “molar” (versus “molecular”) individual in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) terms).

Such a dualism differs from the tradition of the Cartesian cogito because the self, here, is understood as a conceptual (in Deleuze, “virtual,” that is, potential) unity, whereas Descartes and the Platonic tradition before Descartes premised the empirical actuality of material or ideal essences independent of the events that allow their then being “shaped” in different ways (one recalls here Descartes’s famous wax metaphor as well as the unresolved problem of the specificity of forms in Plato’s dialogues). Both Deleuze and Harre’s works argue for the importance of -events as “releasers” (Harré, 2001) or as moments of becoming in Deleuze that allow expressions to take place and selves to eventually be identified. “Events,” in what follows, will be understood as the conceptual site where agency and its structured expression are joined, where potentiality is turned into actualization. “Surfaces” will be seen as the materials, textures, and forms through which expression is given, what after Deleuze, we may call directionality or “sense” (sens).

For Deleuze (Deleuze, 1990), surfaces produce sense, and from sense, there may be derived or produced different forms of meaning. Surfaces produce sense because whether they are discursive surfaces or physical surfaces, other surfaces and forces manifest themselves in some manner through their affects and this manifestation may make a difference in terms of physical effects or in terms of thought. Surfaces are the variously textured, relatively porous or non-porous sites of mixtures between bodies, and so affective relations begin at the level of surfaces and may or may not form more substantial bodies with “depth” afterwards. Surfaces are, thus, sites for events—for the expansion or shrinkage of extensions and for the creation of other surfaces and bodies.

Deleuze (1990) illustrates his valorization of surface and sense through the character of Alice in Lewis Carroll’s -Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. For Deleuze, Carroll’s famous double entendres and other rhetorical plays demonstrate the bi-directionality of sense on language’s surface. Deleuze is also concerned with the other half of the “double articulation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) of expression, besides the sense of language, the language of physical sense. Alice’s extensions and shrinkages and her often playful manners of relating to the other characters in Carroll’s tales, and particularly, they to her, help bring her, paradoxically, from a philosophy of “false depth” (Deleuze, 1990, p.10) embedded in the metaphysical conundrums of language and life to a philosophy of the surface

after descending down the rabbit hole or entering through the “other side” of the mirror and encountering the “critical,” seemingly mad, philosophical analyses of the other characters.

But, “depth,” in Deleuze’s work should not be regarded as a negative concept; Deleuze’s criticism of depth is directed at the reification of depth in Platonic essences, the cogito, and more recently, in reified notions of mental content, such as has occurred in cognitive psychology and in other social science fields indebted to such (such as some “user” research areas of information science). Depth, for Deleuze, indicates a *puissance* (French), *potenza* (Italian), or *potentia* (Latin) (powers, potentialities, and potencies, in English) of mixtures that are expressed through surfaces: “The question is now about bodies taken in their undifferentiated depth and in their measureless pulsation. This depth acts in an original way, -by means of its power to organize surfaces and to envelope itself within surfaces” (Deleuze, 1990 p.124). Such expressions of potential powers literally make sense through linguistic and physical surfaces, and conversely, the notion of “surface” may be characterized through the customs, habits, linguistic, physical, and psychological orders and senses that -allow expression to occur in such and such ways (i.e., according to directionality or *sens*).

The limits to the production of sense, for Deleuze (1990), lie in surfaces too. Outside of the concept of surface there is the risk of a metaphysics of “false depths”—illusional mental contents and determinative faculties hypothesized and reified from out of verbal descriptions of actions (e.g., “belief,” “knowledge,” and “artistic creation,” from believing, knowing, and creating, respectively)--ideal essences, illusions of matter and form, rather than potentialities, actions, and descriptions. In Deleuze’s fantastic, or perhaps, literal, infantile beyond or before of surfaces, the materials of language—sounds—fall back into the meaningless babble of potential mixtures: “When this production [i.e., the production of sense by statements and states of bodies] collapses, or when the surface is rent by explosions and by snags, bodies fall back again into their depth; everything falls back again into the anonymous pulsation wherein words are no longer anything but affections of the body—everything falls back into the primary order which grumbles beneath the secondary organization of sense” (Deleuze, 1990 p.125).[1] Surfaces are, thus, not only compositional for the secondary order, but are intrinsic to granting to the primary order a unified field, and, thus, stipulating intentionality and recognitions and self-recognition from such.

The work of the contemporary political philosopher, Antonio Negri, must be mentioned here, in so far as the logic of surfaces that we have presented is expanded to an analysis and theory of political manifestations. For Negri, one of the most primary surfaces for political manifestations is that of language. In language, common nouns or common names (*nome comune*) constitute possible locations for conceptual schemas that both embody certain ontological powers (*puissance/potenza*) and give rise to other types of ontic powers (*pouvoir/potere*). As such, *nome comune* stand at the junction between the potential and the possible.

The common name is, literally, an event, that allows the expression of multiple powers, of multiple “names” in a common name (Negri, 2000 pp.30-31; Negri 2003b p.156). The notion of *nome comune* is similar to Deleuze’s understanding of propositions, namely, that like propositions, *nome comune* refer to states of affairs. The verification of political propositions, for example, as empirically true remains a question of, broadly understood, empirical experimentation (or simply put, experience). (Though the value of such propositions in the realm of social, philosophical, and literary discourses, of course, is not exhausted by, nor reducible to, referential functions, since the future or past histories of concepts have narrative functions in political theory, as well as in political praxis and self-understandings of political identity and agency.) Common names have a symbolic political function, in the sense that they locate conceptual nexuses and directions for thought and physical action. For Negri, politics involves not simply critiques of empirical political events and of concepts, but the imaginative construction and reconstruction of concepts (*nome comune*) toward socially common, that is, political, futures (“The imagination is a linguistic gesture--and thus, common--the gesture of casting a net toward the future, in order to know it, construct it, and organize it, through power (*potenza*),” Negri, 2000 p.31). For Negri, *nome comune* are linguistic and conceptual materials through which not just personal, but also, social powers are stored and released through further linguistic acts or through physical actions. For Negri, one method of political theory is that of critically examining *nome comune* operating in, and as, the public sphere, and conversely, another is that of deploying new terms that may be empirically tested by political events (Negri, 2003a). Here, in a Kantian manner, the reality of political understanding—and with that, self-understanding--is formed by aesthetic and imaginative powers in relation to the possibilities of practical events. This is the Enlightenment (and later, Romantic) idea of the free person as a product and producer of historical risk—that is, risk not only toward the physical or even conceptual continuation of self, but also, more importantly, toward the establishment, critique, or destruction of narratives of history, themselves. The Enlightenment idea of freedom—that is, freedom as an event--takes place precisely in the caesura between the imaginative and the practical, judgment and reason, and it is here--in slightly different ways for Enlightenment, Romantic, and even modern reason,--that in and as risk, history—and the self--are established as the real.

Just as Deleuze’s pre-ontic realm is identified as a realm of pure *potentia*, without strict measure, so Negri’s realm of *potenza* is identified as a realm both *smisurato* (immeasurable; boundless) and as *dismisura* (excess; beyond measure) (Negri, 2000). Sometimes Negri (2000) and Hardt and Negri (2001) discuss this ontological realm in terms of “desire” and sometimes, synonymously, in terms of a pre-ontic form of social capital, namely one constituted, in part, by affects (Negri, 1999). As in Deleuze’s work, where the realm of the potential is, in a sense, real, so here, social relations in Negri’s work form an empirical ground that goes “beyond” traditional empirical claims. It is unclear, however, if in Negri’s work the ontological realm is dependent or independent of the ontic and its surfaces or if the ontological realm contains its own powers, independent of the ontic (which in Negri’s work

often assumes the name of “capital,” at least in so far as the ontic commonly appears today in the guise of values dominated by capitalist economic and social relationships (see, for example, Negri, 1999, and for an explication, Day, 2002)). If we were to suppose that the ontological stands as the effect, however different, of a capitalist surface, though, then we would be betraying the very Workerist traditions that Negri’s work emerged out of, namely, a tradition of Marxism wherein non-capitalist values of production are taken as real, not simply hypothetical, and “beyond” and excessive to the logic capitalism imposes upon them (Day, 2002).

At this point, let us leave aside Negri’s political extension of Deleuze’s notion of emergence and expression and return to the epistemological analysis. In certain Anglophone philosophers the problem of potentiality is taken up in terms of dispositions. Harré (2001) has discussed the problem of formal causality in terms of dispositions, challenging the Humean destruction of efficient causality in the physical sciences and challenging the Cartesian reification of the concept of self in terms of mental contents, faculties, and structures. Harré’s work follows a philosophical reconstruction of psychological agency from linguistic and anthropological evidence, rather than beginning with psychological categories prior to their linguistic and social construction. We might link Harré’s notion of “discursive psychology” (Harré, 1995) to Michel Foucault’s understanding of “discourse” in so far as both stress linguistic and social assemblages that construct paths for expression and give the possibilities for structures and identities. Such an account is amenable to a discussion of “surfaces” as we have been using this term.

For Harré (1989), the self, analogous to hypothetical nominal essences in the physical sciences (chemistry, physics), is a conceptual (not empirical) unity that explains real events. (On the other hand, “persons,” for Harré, are identities within social or moral orders (Harré, 1989).) In a Kantian manner, the concept of “the self” acts as a causal explanation for personal actions even though its own existence is not empirical. Because of selves, we assume a unity of action for an individual, as for ourselves as well (Harré, 1989); if we did not, then causal understandings of our own and others agency (i.e., intentionality) would be meaningless.

Following Wittgenstein’s (1958) critique, the grammar of having a self is misleading. For Harré, the self is a conceptual notion that allows us to explain personal causal agency in the presence of a restricted range of effects. Premising it as an empirical object is impossible and it is unnecessary for its powers to persist, both theoretically and practically. The self, analogous to physical powers, such as gravity, or other hypothesized physical or chemical existents, is a hypothetical conceptual unity whose existence is premised given certain regular, recognized events understood as effects. These are powers whose expressions are possible in certain allowable conditions (“contexts”), not powers that are free of those conditions or “events” (i.e., certain theological concepts, such as God or the soul, in so far as such are traditionally understood as self-causing essences, are not analogous to Harré’s hypothetical conceptual unities). The notion of “disposition” stresses that these “causes” are virtual or potential—in the sense that they may or may not occur—and

that their expressions are only relatively variable given certain “releasing” contexts and events (Harré, 2001) that both allow and constitute the character of certain expressions. Such contexts and events may be understood as the “formal” causes for the expression of powers.

Harré’s understanding of dispositional powers and his notion of contexts as releasers of these powers is developed from his analysis of dispositional properties in the physical sciences (Harré, 1986), but he then extends these analyses to philosophical and psychological problems of mind and agency (Harré, 1989). Harré’s assertion that dispositional properties are to be treated as hypothetical transcendental unities makes no assertion of ontological and ontic realms, whereas, Negri’s work, for example, makes a strong claim as to the independence of the ontological, at least in so far as the ontological is to be understood as a realm distinct from--in terms of measure and in terms of limits--to, the ontic. (Deleuze’s work, as I have suggested, is more ambivalent in regard to claiming distinct ontological and ontic realms.)

The above dualisms may be understood in terms of potentials on the one hand and actualization and realizations, respectively, on the other (to use Deleuze’s (1986) terminology). We have discussed the first realm as a sort of primary realm and the second realm as an organizing, secondary realm, without which, however, the primary would fail to appear or be sensed as unified over time. Whereas the first realm encompasses hypothetical causes as concepts, the latter encompasses simple and complex empirical “effects.” We have described this latter realm in terms of material surfaces, because it involves, like commonly understood physical surfaces, affective bodies that interact and that express powers. The manner of such expressions in terms of extension, directionality, intensity, and explicit and implicit manifestations, varies, of course, depending on the actual situation. Raindrops that fall upon a macadam roadway are extended and may have further effects because of the material composition and possibilities given them by that particular surface. Their dispositional and affective powers are manifested in slightly different ways by that surface in comparison to as if they fell upon the sand on a beach. In the same way, human sounds and other gestures are organized in the first years of life by the world, particularly, the world of the parents, allowing the infant to gain a particular identity and expressiveness (Harré, 1989) from a given physical “hardware.” Just as the macadam road allows the raindrop to express its molecular dispositions or “powers” in certain manners, so language allows people to express their powers in certain ways, though in the case of socially embedded powers, of course, the social embeds itself in, and as, the potentialities of the powers themselves (i.e., the “self”), as well. The folding of the social into the personal and, conversely, the unfolding of the personal into the social, in this way, makes the social not so much efficiently causal or determinative of the personal, but more, formally constitutive of such.

If we were to visually diagram such a theory of expression and emergence, it might look like a “T” with the vertical bar standing for agency and the horizontal bar standing for the various surfaces that agency emerges through and is expressed by.

The point of conjunction of these two bars would constitute an event or events through which both agency is expressed and structure is reaffirmed or is renegotiated. "Surfaces" may be understood as constituting the material properties, textures, and textualities that mediate and express agency toward structure or its renegotiation and that give back to agency its potentials and possibilities for further expression and identity. Surfaces may or may not be folded and or repeated so as to constitute structures that may give agency a "molar" modality. Surfaces may also lead, like a board under the rain, to the "flowing" of agency's power to other or later forms of expression and structuration. "Structure" connotes stability, and in terms of agencies, the self-reflexive repetition and conservation of forces. In the following section, we will survey some of the properties of surfaces that, among other effects, can lead toward or away from structures.

III. Surfaces

Some qualities of surfaces that may be examined are: 1) texture, 2) durability (hardness and softness in relation to another body, for example), 3) extensions due to repetition, and 4) the foldability of surfaces and certain qualities (such as structure and identity) which are the result of such folds.

Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star have suggested that metaphors of texture in regard to infrastructures describe "enabling-constraining patterns over a set of systems (texture) and developmental patterns for an individual operating within a given set (trajectory)" (Bowker and Star, 1999 p.323). The notion of enabling and constraining patterns (broadly, "contexts") leading to developmental processes is a function of the relation of immanent powers and material properties and their "textures." Textures include permeability or impermeability and the ability of one surface to resist, absorb, or to fold into or out of another surface and thus, possibly, to create a third entity, an "in-between" that has the properties of a distinct third or shows itself as an incomplete hybrid (mixing vinegar with baking soda eventually results in a gas, carbon dioxide, with a material residue, whereas vinegar mixed with water results in diluted vinegar). Resistance, absorption, or the ability of one surface to express another or to be more fully expressed by another is a result of material properties and the types, duration, and quality of forces applied.

Brian Massumi's discussion (Massumi, 1992 pp.10-46) of the concept of force in Deleuze and Guattari's two volumes of --Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983 and 1987) and other works by Deleuze contains many wonderful illustrations of the different qualities of materials and their relations to different types of forces and subsequent expressions. Massumi's example (1992 p.10f.) of the event of a metal plane pushing against a piece of wood and the surface of its blade cutting into and dominating the wood in order to lead to the expression of certain

patterns and colors of the wood, the release of moisture, etc., well illustrates the problem of texture as well as the “releasing” nature of contextual events upon the potential expressiveness of materials. When applied to problems of infrastructure, these notions of material qualities, powers, and expression stress that the notion of “infrastructure” refers to relations of forces that result in expressions, structures, and identities.

Dispositions are oriented toward the past and the future, as well as the present. Organisms and molecules have historically developed in relations with other organisms and molecules and their potentiality lies within mixtures and events in the present, past, and future. Again, Massumi’s example of various qualities that lie within the wood, present to the woodworker and his or her tools, well illustrates this point:

It [a quality of the wood read as a sign] is simultaneously an indicator of a future potential and a symptom of a past. It envelops material processes pointing forward (planing; being a table) and backward (the evolution of the tree’s species; the natural conditions governing its individual growth; the cultural actions that brought that particular wood to the workshop for that particular purpose). Envelopment is not a metaphor. The wood’s individual and phylogenetic past exists as traces in the grain, and its future as qualities to be exploited. On a first, tentative level, meaning is precisely that: a network of enveloped processes.

(Massumi, 1992 p.11)

Even better than Massumi’s example, however, may be that of dye entering paper or wood. In the same way as the dye enters into the paper and wood and comes to express both the powers and properties of the dye and the wood, so children grow or “seep” into language and other cultural and social materials (and these material into children) and both their identities and the materials of language become visible through this process. Whereas Massumi’s example is that of dominating forces, the example of dye is that of fully positive or expansive forces, which may act as an analogy for the overall progress of growth in life. In children’s learning and use of language, language becomes historically concrete and existent, while the identity of each child becomes historically concrete and existent. The hypothetical or “virtual” ideas of “language” or “self” are actualized only through intermixing, existential events and material surfaces and affects. The concept of “language” as a whole is as ideal and as virtual as the concept of the child’s self as a whole, yet each is established as a practical, theoretical and regulative idea (i.e., as a whole) only through concrete, temporal, and necessarily partial, affective mixtures and expressions.

The notion of “folds” (Massumi, “envelopment,” above) is widely developed in Deleuze’s work, most of all in his book, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Deleuze, 1993). The concept refers to the affective mixtures of different properties and powers in time and their mutual folding and unfolding in and through each other. Sense is the product of matter affecting other matter at their conjoining surfaces.

Folds occur in relation to materials in and through time. In the folding and unfolding of matter expressing itself as powers and affects, time itself comes to be felt as something material with its own affective powers. But, folds also occur as the psychological folding of moments, as occurs in memory for example, and this is the fold of the person. Proust’s novel, *Recherche du temps perdu*, constitutes one of the most complex and intensive representations of this process, of course. In that novel, moments are suggested as being folded into the structuration of a person, depicted in the novel as the time of a particular subject (the first person narrator), and this subject, then, unfolds in various turns as a person and as a self through meetings with other persons and objects in the various temporalities that make up public and private life. These foldings and unfoldings trace persons through the forward and backward shuttles of time, and from out of these weavings there emerges public and personal senses of identity.

The concept of repetition is important in regard to public remembrance as well as to the phenomenon of memory, for repetition extends various surfaces in time by means of historical retrieval. Historical retrieval doesn’t just bring the past into the present, but casts the present forward in certain manners rather than others, and with this casting, throws the subject into the future as a certain identifiable person. The ability of surfaces to carry a subject into the future varies. Surfaces such as ritual discourses depend on standardized narratives and even upon rhythmical devices for establishing the subject within a certain social space as a person or as a character. Oral literature, and the classical literature that rests upon it, highly depends upon these mnemonic devices. On the other hand, Lyotard (1984) has suggested that genuine scientific discourses implicitly contain methodological strategies for permitting challenges to their truth claims, though it is also true that scientific discourses function within larger social, epistemological, methodological, rhetorical, and cultural frames which bracket in various ways this ideal of scientific practice and position “science,” too, within the important modernist surface and sense of progressive historicism.

Along with folds, repetition in its extensionable modality is a device that can be used for creating structures, either in one form or in progressive forms. In Euclidean space, geometrical bodies may be created by the elongation of lines and points. Traditionally, structures—social, cultural, or even physical—act as sites where expectations and anticipations dwell, recognitions are “made,” and where the recognized event can be “discovered” and elongated in, and as, history.

Rom Harré, especially in two books, *Social Being* (1979) and *Personal Being* (1984), has developed the notion of “moral orders” to designate social identities and

roles constructed by grammars, narratives, and non-linguistic cultural devices that largely give selves their literal public personas in terms of recognized intentions and responsibilities, but which can also suggest extraordinary, non-prescribed situations for given agents, lying in what deconstruction has more generally identified as an ethical undecidability. The existence of moral orders and surfaces is intrinsic to maintaining stable social relations through matrixes of expectations, responsibilities, and reliance, but the existence of such orders and surfaces also suggests, as Wittgenstein's (1958) pointed out with his discussion of the analogous orders and surfaces of "language games," that the spaces between such surfaces and orders offer generative, creative potential, as well as risk. If governed by the Kantian "ought," for example, moral orders reach into an uncertain future, from an indeterminate present and, at best, a multitude of imaginary pasts, and thus they may exist at the edge of time and at the emergence of surfaces. In this, the moral turns into the ethical, prescription turns into judgment, based on indetermination and causal uncertainty. If surfaces function according to a "social informatics" governed by a logic of recognition, identities and duties, such a social informatics does not exhaust the expressive potentials of individual persons in affective relationships with others in changing situational, radically temporal, conditions. Surfaces change and shift their relations to one another, new surfaces emerge, and old surfaces disappear within such conditions.

Robert Pogue Harrison, in his book on the presence of the dead in the everyday life of the living (Harrison, 2003) points to rituals of grieving as practices that attempt to draw the griever back toward the world of the living, away from the world of the dead and the madness of grief. Consequently, these rituals also help eventually mark for the living the absolute difference between the living and the dead—a difference that must become real lest the griever fail in overcoming grief. Here, not only may surfaces be conceptualized in terms of moral orders, but also in terms of the social order in general and in terms of existence itself. Here, even more than with Harré's concept of "moral orders," we can see that discursive and ritualized social surfaces give the possibility for both personal and social psychological existences.

Along with Proust's work, through Harrison's (2003) example of grief we can see that the most psychologically intensive fold may not be that of the agent "within space," but of space—that is, surfaces--within the agent. The infrastructure of the self is the multitude of surfaces and their relations that make the conceptual unity of the self's potentialities possible and real. The problem with "the dead" as a surface for expression is that the dead are, literally, dead—the person's grief is the expression of powers that have nowhere to go except the imaginary itself. Grieving rituals, on the other hand, attempt to mark the end of death as not just imaginary, but real, through repetitions that have expression itself as their goal. In the act of grieving, the power of life not so ironically reappears, and eventually will reabsorb acts of grief, as markers both of the dead and living persons, into a developing self. Deleuze (1988 pp.94-123) suggested that the very doubling of the individual--from persons to selves--was an invention of the Ancient Greeks. This claim is not fully

satisfactory since no culture lacks some sort of psychology of self. The important point, however, is to see that surfaces are not just materials upon which the self's potentialities may be expressed, but also, that they constitute the very potentialities and unities that we call a "self."

IV. Conclusion

The above conceptual schemas attempt to characterize the nature of bodies—structures and identities--in terms of powers, expressions, and the material surfaces that allow those powers to express themselves as personal and collective bodies. It does not attempt to locate those powers in fixed material or formal essences, nor in terms of fully determinate, efficient, social causes. Potential powers and their actualizing surfaces underlie notions of agency, identity, and structure. The events that are composed of actual expressions of powers form the "infrastructure" of bodies and the reality of space. The term "infrastructure" must be thought in terms of expressive events through which both bodies and notions of space are arrived at. Conceptions of space that don't account for powers and their expression empty the concept of "space" of any materialist and historical meaning, reducing space to being understood, in a Kantian manner, as a purely formal background or even "structure" for events, instead of as the product of such.

Bowker, G. and Star, S.L. (1999). *Sorting things out*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.

Day, R. (2002). Social capital, value, and measure: Antonio Negri's challenge to capitalism. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 53 (12), pp. 1074-1082.

Deleuze, G. (1988). *Foucault*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G. (1990). *The logic of sense*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, G. (1993). *The fold: Leibniz and the baroque*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1983). *Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

Harré, R. (1979). *Social being: a theory for social psychology*. Totowa, NJ, Rowan and Littlefield.

Harré, R. (1984). *Personal being: a theory for individual psychology*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

Harré, R. (1989). The 'self' as a theoretical concept. IN: Krausz, M. ed. *Relativism: interpretation and confrontation*. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press.

Harré, R. (1995). *Discursive psychology*. IN: Smith, J., Harré, R. and Van Langenhove, L., *Rethinking psychology*. London, Sage Publications.

Harré, R. (2001). *Active power and powerful actors*. IN: *Philosophy at the new millennium (supplement to Philosophy, No. 48)*, 91-109.

Harré, R. and Madden, E.H. (1975). Causal powers: a theory of natural necessity. Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield.

Harrison, R. P. (2003). The dominion of the dead. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Massumi, B. (1992). A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.

Negri, A. (1999). Value and affect. IN: Boundary 2 26 (2), pp.77-88

Negri, A. (2000). Kairòs, alma venus, multitudo: nove lezione impartite a me stesso. Rome, Manifestolibri.

Negri, A. (2003a). Cinque lezioni su Impero e dintorni. Milan, Raffaello Cortina Publishing.

Negri, A. (2003b). Kairòs, alma venus, multitudo. IN: Time for revolution. London, Continuum.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations. London, Basil Blackwell.

[1] This passage is very reminiscent, of course, of Hegel's famous passage on the "night of the now" in the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*. The similarity of forms, here, between a potential and actualized, between a somewhat beyond-measure mixture and a somewhat measured public reason, in not only Deleuze's, but also in

Hegel's and even, somewhat, in Harré's dualism (of self and person), raises the issue of a philosophical tradition of dualism other than that of the Platonic or Cartesian.